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Abstract
Background: Amidst an Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic of unprecedented magnitude in west Africa, concerns
about the risk of importing EVD led to the introduction of programs for the screening and monitoring of travellers
in a number of countries, including Australia. Emerging reports indicate that these programs are feasible to implement,
however rigorous evaluations are not yet available. We aimed to evaluate the program of screening and monitoring
travellers in New South Wales.
Methods: We conducted a mixed methods study to evaluate the program of screening and monitoring travellers in New
South Wales. We extracted quantitative data from the Notifiable Conditions Information Management System database
and obtained qualitative data from two separate surveys of public health staff and arrivals, conducted by phone.
Results: Between 1 October 2014 and 13 April 2015, public health staff assessed a total of 122 out of 123 travellers. Six
people (5%) developed symptoms compatible with EVD and required further assessment. None developed EVD. Aid
workers required lower levels of support compared to other travellers. Many travellers experienced stigmatisation.
Public health staff were successful in supporting travellers to recognise and manage symptoms.
Conclusion: We recommend that programs for monitoring travellers should be tailored to the needs of different
populations and include specific strategies to remediate stigmatisation.
Background
During the Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic of unpre-
cedented magnitude in West Africa, concerns of the risk
of importation of EVD led a number of countries to
introduce entry screening and monitoring of travellers
from EVD affected areas; these countries included
United Kingdom (UK) [1], United States of America
(US) [2, 3], Japan [4], Israel [5], and Australia. Monitor-
ing symptoms, with or without restricting movement of
individuals who have been in contact with the disease is
a well-established public health measure to contain
outbreaks of EVD. However the application of these
measures to travellers from EVD affected areas is rela-
tively new and evidence of the effectiveness of these
measures is limited.
While the World Health Organization (WHO) has not
issued guidance on the need for monitoring travellers
from EVD affected countries, it has provided guidelines
for countries wanting to introduce entry screening [6].
The European Centers for Disease Prevention and
Control (ECDC) recommends monitoring of healthcare
workers returning from EVD affected areas but not for
other travellers [7]. The US Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) recommends entry screening and
follow-up monitoring for travellers from EVD affected
countries, regardless of whether they had known contact
with an EVD case because, “travellers from countries
with widespread transmission or uncertain control
measures may be unaware of their exposure to individ-
uals with symptomatic Ebola infection” [3].
Emerging reports from countries that screened and
monitored travellers indicate that these programs are
feasible to implement. In the US, 10,344 persons in 60
jurisdictions were monitored between 3 November 2014
and 8 March 2015 [8]. In the UK, 3388 passengers were
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screened at airports between 14 November 2014 and 4
January 2015, and 130 people were referred for monitor-
ing [9]. While the results of rigorous evaluations of such
programs are not yet available, commentaries and
descriptive studies have highlighted potential problems
[4, 5, 10–12]. In Japan, a symptomatic traveller under
monitoring sought healthcare at a local clinic without dis-
closing a travel history, highlighting a weakness of the sys-
tem to direct symptomatic travellers to seek appropriate
healthcare [4]. In Israel, two travellers evaded screening at
the border and were therefore not monitored before they
presented to a hospital with fever, highlighting the low
sensitivity of the screening process [5]. In the US, a review
of jurisdictional procedures for screening and monitoring
indicated that 17 of 55 states and territories implemented
more restrictive policies, such as quarantine, than recom-
mended by the CDC [10]. Commentaries from other
authors highlighted the potential for such restrictive
policies to hinder responses to the epidemic [11, 12].
Concerns have also been raised about the potential
that screening and monitoring could exacerbate stigma-
tisation of travellers from Ebola affected countries [13].
However no study has described what impact the moni-
toring process may have on travellers.
Our aim was to describe the program of screening and
monitoring travellers from EVD affected countries in
New South Wales (NSW), with a particular focus on the
impact of these measures on the travellers.
Methods
Program description
The rationale for the program, which commenced on 1
October 2014, was to enable early identification of
symptoms in travellers who may have had contact with
EVD, to direct them to appropriate health care facilities,
and to facilitate early management for better outcomes
and to minimise further spread.
We used three mechanisms to identify travellers who
had visited an EVD affected area within the 21 days pre-
ceding their arrival in NSW: 1) entry screening at
airports and ports, 2) lists of returning aid workers from
aid organisations that had recruited them and, 3) lists of
visas granted by the Department of Immigration and
Border Protection to nationals from the three EVD
affected countries. Lists of travellers identified through
entry screening at Sydney International Airport were
available from 14 November 2014; these travellers
declared travel to EVD affected countries on a separate
EVD-specific arrivals card. The latter two mechanisms
were in place at the commencement of the program on
1 October 2014.
Based on intended place of residence, staff from the
Communicable Disease Branch (CDB) at NSW Health dis-
tributed the contact information to one of 15 local public
health units (PHUs) in NSW for follow-up who then con-
tacted individuals within 24 h of arrival to conduct a more
detailed risk assessment (criteria detailed in Table 1).
All individuals were instructed to monitor their
temperature and report to public health officials daily or
weekly, depending on the risk level. Arriving travellers
were also asked to report immediately any symptoms of
interest (fever and other symptoms compatible with EVD
including headache, vomiting or diarrhoea, myalgia,
abdominal pain or unexplained bruising or bleeding) and
to contact the PHU should they require any medical
attention. Individuals reporting any of these symptoms
were notified to the CDB who would decide on their man-
agement in consultation with an infectious diseases (ID)
physician and the PHU. Individuals with high and low risk
exposures were advised to minimise social mixing and
travel, and to stay within ready access of appropriate
health facilities. While quarantine was never recom-
mended, isolation for limited periods was recommended
while patients were symptomatic.
Public health unit staff conducted the risk assessment
using standardised forms with data on demographics,
travel history, potential exposures and any symptoms at
initial assessment; the initial and follow-up data were re-
corded into the NSW Notifiable Conditions Information
Management System (NCIMS).
Study methods
This study comprised both qualitative and quantitative
methods. We extracted data on the number of travellers,
Table 1 Summary of exposure risk categories used by NSW
Health (source: CDNA Series of National Guidelines on Ebola
virus disease [22])
Category Criteria
Very low risk • Near vicinity of an EVD patient
• Visiting a country with widespread EVD transmission
in the past 21 days with no known exposures
• Adequate PPE when in direct contact with EVD case
in Australia
Low risk • Household member of EVD case
• Inadequate PPE plus close contact (being within
1 m of a EVD patient or within room for a
prolonged period of time)
• Inadequate PPE and brief direct contact (e.g.
shaking hands)
• Adequate PPE and direct contact if in an area
of widespread EVD transmission
High risk • Percutaneous (e.g. needle stick) or mucous
membrane exposure to blood or body fluids
of EVD patient
• Inadequate PPE and direct skin contact exposure
to blood or body fluids of EVD patient
• Inadequate PPE and lab processing of body fluids
of an EVD patient
• Inadequate PPE and direct contact with deceased
EVD patient or patient with unknown cause of death
in an EVD affected area
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risk classifications, and identification and management
of symptoms from the NCIMS database. We surveyed
public health staff and travellers who had been screened
and monitored to ascertain their experiences with the
program, focusing on its impact on travellers. This
survey was conducted by phone and collected data on
experiences with three key elements of the program: (1)
initial risk assessment and education, (2) monitoring of
symptoms, and (3) recommendations on the restrictions
of movement.
Sampling
Quantitative data were extracted for all travellers from
EVD affected countries screened between 1 October
2014 and 13 April 2015. For the qualitative component
of the study, we identified a random stratified sample of
travellers using a random number generator to sequence
the travellers and interview sequentially until minimum
quotas of 5 were reached in the two key demographic
groups: aid workers and other travellers. Sample size was
determined by the concept of saturation – we completed
interviews until saturation of themes were reached [14].
One member of staff was interviewed from each public
health unit that conducted monitoring.
Data analysis
We obtained informed consent from all respondents and
conducted thematic analysis of the transcripts of interviews
to identify, group and report themes within the data [15].
Results
Travellers
Between 1 October 2014 and 13 April 2015, 123 travellers
from EVD-affected countries were recorded on the NCIMS
database, with a mean of 9 travellers per fortnight.
Of these, 57 (46%) were female and the median age
was 39 years (range of 5 to 68 years). The most common
reason for travel was aid work (n = 67, 55%) (28 were
healthcare workers), followed by migrants from the
affected areas (including humanitarian entry) (n = 23,
19%), other workers (n = 22, 18%) and leisure or visiting
family members (n = 9, 7%). The category of aid work
covered the fields of healthcare, public health,
epidemiology, water and sanitation, logistics, and health
promotion. Of those travelling for other types of work
the most common reasons given were mining (n = 9,
41%) and media work (n = 6, 27%).
Of the 122 travellers who were assessed, 94 (77%) were
in the very low risk category i.e. they had no known con-
tact with any EVD cases. Twenty-eight (23%) were in the
low risk category i.e. they had direct contact with EVD
cases but had used appropriate personal protective equip-
ment (PPE). None were in the high risk category i.e. direct
contact with EVD cases without appropriate PPE.
No cases of EVD, either within or outside of our
program, were identified in NSW during the study period.
Six people developed symptoms compatible with EVD
requiring further assessment: two people required brief
admission to hospital for further investigation; two people
were reviewed by ID physicians either as an outpatient or
via telephone; and two people were reviewed by public
health staff only (Table 2). Only one person was tested for
EVD – the results were negative. Two other people devel-
oped unrelated symptoms requiring medical review (mental
health assessment and urinary tract infection).
An additional arrival was transferred directly from the
airport to the designated Viral Haemorrhagic Fever
(VHF) hospital before entering the risk assessment and
monitoring program; this person is not included in this
report and did not develop EVD.
There were two travellers requiring hospitalisation.
One was classified as low risk, was transferred to the
designated VHF hospital the day after arrival with symp-
toms and was discharged for ongoing monitoring after
testing negative for Ebola on polymerase chain reaction
(PCR). The second traveller was classified as very low
risk, was transferred to a local tertiary hospital and was
not tested for EVD because this diagnosis was consid-
ered highly unlikely. The respiratory viral multiplex PCR
was positive for influenza.
Patient perspectives
Of the 24 travellers randomly sampled to participate in the
study, 12 consented to be interviewed giving a response
rate of 50%. The remaining 12 could not be contacted by
phone, despite three attempts on consecutive days.
Table 2 Assessment and diagnosis for symptomatic travellers, New South Wales, October 2014 – April 2015
Risk classification Review EVD test Diagnosis
1 Very low Local hospital No Influenza
2 Low Designated hospital Yes Upper respiratory tract infection
3 Low ID physician review No Non-specific symptoms
4 Very low ID physician review No Adverse reaction to de-worming tablets
5 Low Public health No Migraine
6 Very low Public health No Isolated temperature
ID physician Infectious diseases physician
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Impact
All travellers responded positively to the question on
whether temperature monitoring measures were reason-
able. Travellers described the process as simple, easy,
and efficient.
Four interviewees (33%) had been advised to restrict
movement. They reported these restrictions as being
reasonable without any adverse social impacts, such as
not being able to visit friends or attend church, and also
financial impacts, with one person unable to go job--
hunting during the monitoring period. Additionally, two
travellers imposed their own restrictions to avoid being
stigmatised by the community.
Personal relationships
Four travellers volunteered that they valued the personal
contact and support from public health staff, describing
them as ‘nice’ and ‘friendly’.
“I felt supported rather than watched. It was like we
were on the same team.”
One arrival compared the personalised contact more
favourably then the automated text messages received by
a colleague in another state.
Different needs for different populations
Four aid workers reported they already had information
about monitoring procedures in NSW from other
colleagues or from their workplace. Three aid workers
reported that they would have completed similar measures
regardless of public health intervention as temperature
monitoring was also instigated by employers and/or
“ingrained” from time in the field. The most important
element of the program for them was having the relevant
contact details in the event of illness.
In contrast one arrival, a migrant, reported that the
regular follow-up was useful to address questions or
concerns that arose over time, especially relating to fear
and misinformation that was widespread in the commu-
nity. Another migrant responded that consistent follow-
up was necessary as migrants may not have an
understanding of the public health rationale for monitoring.
“Most of us, we are not educated. If you don’t contact
them, some will neglect to collect their body
temperature… if they realise no-one will turn up, no-
one will follow the system”
Of the two interviewees who developed symptoms
compatible with EVD, one was an aid worker who did
not report the headache as it was an isolated symptom
and, based on knowledge gained from his prior training,
did not fulfil the case definition for EVD. Another case
was in a migrant who reported fever with no other
symptoms. He was advised to isolate himself from the
other people in the family, take some paracetamol and
monitor temperatures “more frequently”. The arrival de-
scribed being grateful for the advice and felt reassured.
Staff perspectives
A total of 12 staff from the 12 PHUs agreed to partici-
pate in the survey.
Good compliance
Staff members did not identify any major barriers to
collection of self-monitoring data, and compliance was
high after the initial contact.
“Once or twice I had to remind them but they were
always profusely apologetic. After all these people
have lives.”
Only two staff members described difficulty in
obtaining the self-monitoring data. One described a
healthcare worker, who was repeatedly late in provid-
ing the data and needed repeated prompting. Another
person was lost to follow-up despite contact with
family members who reported the person missing to
the police. The person was later identified and had
been asymptomatic.
Fear and stigmatisation
One staff member described a migrant who had actively
evaded contact by providing false addresses. PHU staff
successfully contacted this person after locating a friend
who was able to reassure the contact that the PHU staff
simply wanted to monitor their health. Another staff
member described being rung up repeatedly by an irate
member of the public using racist language about the
presence of migrants from West Africa in their commu-
nity. In collaboration with the migrant family, the PHU
negotiated a mitigation strategy for the family to keep a
low profile during the incubation period. Several PHUs
(n = 3, 25%) provided assurances to schools, workplaces
and medical facilities to enable travellers or their family
members to attend school and work, and receive appro-
priate medical care.
Different needs for different populations
When asked about any difficulties with the risk assess-
ment and education process, three PHUs (25%)
responded that the process was easier because the
majority of the travellers in their area were healthcare
workers familiar with the disease and the principles and
processes of monitoring.
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Discussion
All travellers that reported or developed symptoms com-
patible with EVD were managed appropriately. Manage-
ment of some patients at home reduced the potential
risks of transmission to the public and reduced the
burden on the hospital system. There were no suspected
or confirmed cases of EVD anywhere in NSW.
Although key elements of the program were agreed to
by the Communicable Diseases Network Australia
(CDNA) and implemented nationwide, implementation
of this program was coordinated at a state level. This led
to some jurisdictional differences, for example the
Department of Health in Western Australia employed
the use of an automated text messaging system [16]. The
use of these systems may be suited to monitoring larger
volumes of travellers [16]. As described in New York,
the program in New South Wales relied on existing pub-
lic health personnel, technology and systems [17].
While our study establishes the feasibility of monitoring
in our setting, its feasibility in other settings will depend
on the volume of travellers. The number of travellers in
NSW were low compared with travellers in the US and
UK, attributable to the smaller population and greater
distance from West Africa. In the UK, over a similar
6-month period between 14 October 2014 and 7 April
2015, 6 031 travellers from EVD affected countries were
screened at ports [9] and 470 of them were monitored by
PHE [9]. In the US 10 344 persons were monitored in 60
states between November 3, 2014 and March 8, 2015 [8].
Similar to our experience in NSW, most travellers to US
from EVD affected countries were in the low but not zero
risk (91%) and a high proportion (99%) completed moni-
toring [8]. The need for, and potential value of these mea-
sures would depend on the context in which it is applied,
with an assessment of the likely costs and benefits, i.e. the
potential likelihood and impact of importation of the
disease, the resources that can be mobilised for the pur-
pose, and the need to manage community ‘outrage’ if such
screening was not in place.
In NSW, five percent of travellers developed one or
more symptoms compatible with EVD. This is higher than
the one percent who developed symptoms from the 2 540
U.S. military service members monitored from 25 October
2014 to 27 February 2015 [18], and the one percent who
developed symptoms from a population travellers in the
US from 3 November 2014 to 8 March 2015 [8].
There was general support for the screening and moni-
toring program from travellers of all demographics and
public health staff. Different levels of support were needed
by the different categories of travellers. While migrants
not familiar to our health systems appreciated ongoing
communication over the monitoring period, travellers
who were health workers were relatively more independ-
ent in monitoring temperatures and managing and
reporting symptoms; the critical information they needed
was how to access the health system appropriately.
Another theme identified was stigmatisation or fear of
stigmatisation of travellers by the community. Similar
attitudes and behaviours were reported in a number of
countries. During the 2000 and 2001 EVD epidemics in
Uganda for example, harassment, rejection, and abandon-
ment of individuals with EVD were common occurrences.
Similar reports were described in the West African
epidemic [19, 20]. In the US, two household contacts of
an EVD case stated they felt unsafe leaving their homes
because of stigmatisation by others in their community
after their photos, names, and addresses had been pub-
lished in the media [21]. The evaluation demonstrated the
positive role of public health authorities in mitigating
some of the stigma surrounding travellers from EVD
affected countries at the height of the epidemic. Public
health authorities have an important role to play in re-
mediating the stigma, by communicating to travellers and
the wider public about real risks and appropriate pre-
ventative measures, as well as strategies to support indi-
viduals facing discrimination; this may include advocating
on their behalf to other institutions, individual counselling
and referral to social support services.
There are a number of limitations to this study. The
primary evaluator participated in the development and
implementation of the screening and monitoring pro-
gram. This has the advantage of ensuring a thorough un-
derstanding of the program. To minimise potential
biases, the design, methodology, results and recommen-
dations of the evaluation were reviewed by supervisors
external to NSW Health. Secondly this study focused on
the monitoring process without examining the sensitivity
of entry screening to identify travellers from EVD af-
fected countries; this was because we did not have access
to details of every arrival from West Africa from an al-
ternative source. This may have implications for the rep-
resentativeness of our results since travellers who
avoided border screening may be less accepting of moni-
toring. However, all nationals from West African
countries were identified and monitored based on the
details provided to us of visas granted by the Department
of Immigration and Border Protection. However the
absence of travellers from EVD affected presenting to
hospitals in NSW without having been previously moni-
tored suggests that the entry screening process was
successful in identifying at-risk travellers.
Conclusion
In conclusion, screening and monitoring of travellers
from EVD affected countries was feasible and widely ac-
cepted by travellers. Overall the program was successful
in addressing the health and social needs of travellers,
supporting travellers encountering stigmatisation and
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linking individuals with appropriate care in the event of
illness. To increase its efficiency, resources should be di-
rected towards supporting migrants in understanding
the need for, and value of, the screening and monitoring
activities, and for minimising their stigmatisation in the
community. Relatively less supervision is required for
returning health workers already familiar with the
principles and importance of monitoring.
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